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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze economic
reforms in Hungary and China, in order to determine what
lessons may be applied in the Soviet Union.
In both Hungary and China, initial reforms were
emphasized in the agricultural sector, rather than in the
industrial sector.
Both countries experienced economic
growth when they utilized this method of reform.
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet
Union in 1985, he did the reverse.
He chose to delay
reforms in the agricultural sector, and emphasized increased
industrialization.
This resulted in continued economic
stagnation, that led the Soviet Union to the verge of
collapse.
The Soviet Union needs to overcome the political and
economic obstacles that delayed reforms in the agricultural
sector.
It is suggested that if the Soviet Union follows
the Hungarian and Chinese examples, economic growth will
increase and this will clear a path towards industrial
modernization.

iv

THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION:
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM HUNGARY AND CHINA?

INTRODUCTION

The interconnected set of political and economic
structures which comprise neo-Stalinism has influenced the
economic systems of Hungary, China, and the Soviet Union in
the pos-war era.

According to Zaslavsky, Neo-stalinism is a

less extreme derivation of Stalinism:
The Stalinist regime used systematic terror for
the mobilization of social resources to accomplish
rapid industrialization and property transfers.
A
centrally administered and planned economy replaced the
market economy.
Control over social production and
distribution was exercised by the highly centralized
party-state apparatus, which monopolized political,
economic, and ideological power. The elimination of
mass physical terror as a means of government by
Stalin's successors still preserved many essential
features of the old Stalinist state (notably the
centralized one-party-state system).1
Since Stalin's death Moscow has tolerated increasing
deviation from the precepts of Soviet-style central
planning.2

However, the stagnation of the past has not

been replaced by any new and dynamic economic growth.
Almost from the beginning of communist rule in the countries
in this study, there has been a consistent trade-off between
Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State:
Class,
Ethnicity, and Consensus In Soviet Society (New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 1982), p. viii.
2William E. Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern Europe:
The Opening Curtain? (London: Westview Press, 1989), p. 377.
2

3

orthodoxy and economic growth. Despite staggering human
costs, the neo-Stalinist model was initially successful in
Hungary, China, and the Soviet Union as a method for
building an industrial infrastructure in what were basically
non-industrialized societies.

However, in the later stages

of development, these economies suffered from declining
growth rates and reductions in labor and capital
productivity that could not be resolved within the design of
the existing model.
As Bialer recently suggested, the neo-Stalinist system
has become obsolete and an obstacle to economic
development.3

It cramps individual initiative, sustains a

superfluous middle-level of administrators who cannot be
removed without social conflict, and breeds a dispirited
labor force lacking in discipline and incentive .u
Since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, perestroika has
evolved into a program which both identifies the failures of
the Soviet politico-economic model and conceptualizes a view
of a future Soviet state with market-oriented and
participative underpinnings.

Under perestroika, the supply

of producer goods was to be based on the wholesale market,
not central allocation.

Excessive controls were to be

3Seweryn
Bialer,
Sources,
Significance,
Quarterly, vol. 103, no.

"Gorbachev's Program
of
Prospects,"
Political
3, Fall 1988, p. 404.

Change:
Science

4"Die Studie Von Novosibirsk," Osteuropa. No. 1, January
1984, p. A 5 .
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replaced by market incentives and autonomous production
relations.5

However, unlike the case in some of the other

reform-oriented socialist countries, perestroika in the
Soviet Union has had very poor results.
The Gorbachev leadership has not undertaken a thorough
overhaul of the economic system or breached the traditional
canons of state socialism in the manner of marketizers in
Hungary and China.6

The principal focus of "economic

restructuring" in the Soviet Union emphasized industrial
modernization.

A more radical market-oriented approach

would have required a fundamental restructuring of the
existing system of economic management and basic changes in
production relations in all economic sectors.

Political

compromises failed to tackle the sector where economic
reform should have begun, namely in agriculture.

Among

other factors, conservatism and political inertia in this
sector in the Soviet Union failed to foster any significant
reform measures.

Reforms in the agricultural sector in both

Hungary and China have fared more favorably than reforms in
the industrial sector.

In the economic conference of June

1987, Oleg Bogomolov pointed to the experience of other
socialist countries:
5Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, eds., Gorbachev1s
Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments (New York: Aldine De
Gruyter, 1988), p. 85.
6Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Gorbachev1s
Russia And American Foreign Policy (London: Westview Press,
1988), p. 163.
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This experience shows that the quickest and most
direct effect for the people is produced by the
application of economic methods of leadership first in
agriculture, trade,the light and food industries, and
in housing construction...It is very characteristic
that economic reforms...began in many countries
precisely in agriculture.7
The agricultural reforms that have been introduced in
China and Hungary represented a striking departure from the
neo-Stalinist economic model.

Reforms in Hungarian

agriculture, which began in the 1950s, were implemented
along a different course, yet still effectively.

The state

made a substantial investment in agriculture, and farm
cooperatives were formed.

The targets from planners were

made flexible, and the cooperatives were allowed to buy and
sell from each other at mutually accepted prices.8

In

China, communes were disbanded in the 1970s, land was handed
over to the peasants, and output targets were abolished.9
In addition, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established
as "experiments" with a more market-oriented approach.
Perestroika was intended to drag the Soviet Union away
from the "abyss" and set it on course to modernization and
prosperity.10

Notwithstanding the various attempts to

devolve decision-making, the Soviet economy remains in all
7Pravda, June 13, 1987.
8Ibid., p . 36.
9Ibid., p . 3 6.
10Peter Frank, The World Today, Nov. 1989, vol. 45, no.
11, (England: The Royal Institute of International Affairs),
p. 185.

important respects centrally-planned and centrallycontrolled.

In fact, until 1988, Gorbachev barely spoke of

private enterprise, cooperatives, and small and medium-sized
enterprises and said as little as possible about agriculture
and the consumer sector.

It is important to examine the

failures and successes of reform programs in Hungary and
China in order to determine what lessons may be drawn in
order to foster economic reforms in the Soviet Union.
Hungary and China both achieved better economic results by
initially emphasizing reform programs in their agricultural
sectors.

It is important to realize that when Gorbachev

assumed power in 1985 in the Soviet Union, he focused his
reform efforts upon the industrial sector.

If he had

followed the recent paths of Hungary and China, positive
economic results would have occurred at a faster pace.

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC REFORMS IN HUNGARY

2.1

Introduction

By 1950, Hungary had adopted the neo-Stalinist economic
model in its entirety.

This not only meant that Hungary

introduced the same institutional and hierarchical
structures, but that the direction of economic planning
placed emphasis upon heavy industry and the forced
collectivization of agriculture.

Until 1956, agricultural

output remained essentially unchanged.11

The result was a

rapid growth of output but a decline in living standards.
In an attempt to realize centrally set economic goals,
the Rakosi government flooded the economy with more and more
regulations.

The political leadership at this time felt

that centralization with an emphasis on industrialization
was a definite advantage because workers and intellectuals
with limited experience were taking over the management of
the economy.

Thus, the human factor necessitated the

n Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 286.
7
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strengthening of central control.12

This system of central

planning operated independent of market forces and fostered
the development of a hierarchy in which all central
objectives became subordinate to fulfilling the plan.
Secretary General Rakosi was removed from power in
1956.

His government had been successful at blocking every

effort to enact radical corrections.

The delay in reform in

1955-6, however, was no longer just an economic problem.

It

had definitely become an element of deepening political
crisis which hindered the realization of economic reform.
The economic system established specific targets for the
performance of enterprises, but was not conducive to an
efficient, high-level of production.

This is supported by

the increased emphasis on foreign trade during this period.
Hungary's economic development called for increased supplies
of Western imports, and investment decisions were based upon
foreign trade considerations.
Following the 1956 revolution, a new government was
established under Janos Kadar.

The new political leadership

wanted to reconstruct and strengthen the socialist system by
both maintaining and reforming basic principles. The slogan
of a "dual front struggle" against anti-socialist and
doctrinaire-Stalinist extremism expressed an immense effort
to adapt to Hungarian circumstances.

It was argued that

12Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Hungary: A Century of
Economic Development
(New York:
Harper and Row, 1974), p.
201.
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agricultural policy had to serve this basic aim...it must
assure a great increase of agricultural production in
private farms and in the socialist sector of agriculture as
well.13
The focus upon agriculture was certainly a political
necessity.

In order for the Kadar government to consolidate

power, it needed the allegiance of the previously alienated
agricultural peasantry.

The method of compulsory delivery

of agricultural products was stopped.

Rakosi had previously

called for the abolition of this system.

The perpetuation

of this system would have been a political disaster for the
Kadar regime, so the basic pillars of the command economy in
agriculture were destroyed.14

The state organs bought

agricultural products from the peasants.

And if they wanted

to buy, they had to pay market prices for them.

At least in

this sector of the Hungarian economy, a planned market
economy was introduced.

This was a pioneering step towards

a new economic model.
Measures of reform in the industrial sector during this
period were ineffective.

Industrial firms even urged the

establishment of economic discipline for a better basis to

13For instance, see A Magyar Szocialista
Hatarozata Es Dokument Umai, 1956, p. 13.
14Berend and Ranki, p. 23 3.

Munkaspart
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fulfill their plans. 15They felt that the state should
determine what and how much they produced.

Consequently,

almost all activities in this sector remained under strict
state control.

The consequences of reform efforts in later

decades still bore many similarities to the neo-Stalinist
model.
The reform process in Hungary has not been a linear
progression;

it has undergone fluctuations and reversals.

Because of the rapid consolidation of the Kadar regime, the
importance of continuity was more often stressed during this
period.16

It was nevertheless clear by the mid-1960s that

Hungary was reaching the limits of a neo-Stalinist model.
For example, by this time the labor sources, which had
created an easy way to extensive industrialization, became
exhausted.

With a shortage of labor becoming ever more

severe (and little labor available for transfer from
agriculture) economic growth could only proceed on the basis
of faster productivity growth.17

The political leadership

recognized that the incentive structures of the neoStalinist model were not effective at delivering
productivity increases.

15Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe Gorbachev and Reform: The
Great Challenge
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 176-7.
16Ibid. , p. 178.
1988

17Ivan T. Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms: 1953(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 197.
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More comprehensive reforms occurred with the
introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968.
The thrust of the NEM was the abandonment of central
planning in favor of a combination of the self-regulating
market mechanism and central control exercised through
indirect, market-compatible fiscal and monetary
instruments.18

The NEM did succeed in temporarily cutting

enterprises loose from central authorities, and led to a
reduction in their size.

Between 1968 and 1973, the average

annual growth rate under this system was close to 7 per
cent.19

However, the NEM was npt complemented by a

depoliticization of economic life.

The problem was that by

eschewing any political changes, the 1968 reform failed to
establish the necessary institutions for solving the clashes
of interests that developed in the reform process.

Ad hoc

economic regulators fostered an arbitrary economic policy.
The realization of NEMs objectives was frustrated in
the early 1970s by resistance, reversals, and backsliding by
the Kadar leadership.

From 1973 to 1978, a political

counter attack blocked continuing reform.

Individuals

opposing Kadar's policies exploited the social tension that
had arisen as a result of unequal increases in income.

This

18Josef C.
Brada and Istvan Dobozi,
eds.,
Money.
Incentives, and Efficiency In The Hungarian Economic Reform
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 3.
19Thomas H. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening The
Closed Society
(Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath and Company,
1988) , p. 55.
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had made it possible to criticize the reform program as
encouraging private activity, which neglected workers'
interests.20

Although the reform principles were not

abandoned in favor of a return to central planning, there
was less scope for independent action, and the market's
influence was much smaller than the original reform had
envisioned.
Wider parameters of informal state intervention
gradually re-strengthened centralization.

Enterprises in

Hungary continued to suffer from intervention by their
ministerial superiors.

Traditional modes of behavior on the

part of central planners and enterprise directors were
deeply entrenched;

they did not change easily even after

such a radical reform as the NEM was introduced.

This

stopped the previously dynamic development of small
enterprises for a number of years.
Additionally, the major consequence for Hungary of the
large increase in world prices of oil and other imported raw
materials during this period was a sharp deterioration in
its terms of trade with other countries.

During 1974-78,

the terms of trade worsened by approximately 2 0 per cent.21
This development, coupled with a rapid expansion in the
volume of imports from the West, led to a steady increase in
20Paul Hare, Hugo Radice, and Nigel Swain, Hungary: A
Decade of Economic Reform
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1981),
p. 73.
21Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 4.
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Hungary's trade deficit.

The total amount of foreign debt,

which started to accumulate in 1974, reached 4.8 billion
dollars in 1977 and 8.1 billion dollars in 1980.22
Economic policy shifted toward moderating the growth of
domestic demand and making additional goods available for
export to the West.
The Kadar leadership, occupied with restrictions on
enterprise autonomy and strengthening its international
position, substantially lost its ability to perceive
economic problems, and hardly reacted to them.

State-owned

industries like steel and coal were draining the economy
with losses.

The Hungarian government heavily taxed the

private and more productive areas of the industrial sector
to subsidize these inefficient enterprises.

By 1976, the

leadership realized that its reaction to the crises of the
early 197 0s had been unsuccessful. The retrenchment policy
and the return to hierarchical management had failed.23
The leadership wanted to adapt the lessons learned from
agriculture to the industrial sector.

They began to re-

encourage the development of small enterprises and reduce
state subsidies. In 1980, the amount of central
enterprises decreased to 40 per cent of that

subsidies to

in 1979.24

At

22Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 246.
23Eva Kerpel and David G. Young, Hungary To 1993: Risks
And Rewards Of Reform
(London: Economic Intelligence Unit,
1988), p. 25.
24Ibid. , p . 25.
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the initiative of the center, 200 new companies were
established by breaking up a number of large inefficient
enterprises.

The majority of state-owned restaurants and

small shops were given over to private individuals on a
rental basis from the state.
The problem in Hungary has been, therefore, waves of
reform measures that have displayed great discrepancies
between their anticipated impacts and their actual effects.
This has led many workers and managers, especially in the
industrial sector, to apply ’’wait and see” tactics as a
means of self-defense.25

When there appeared to be an

insufficient response to newly introduced regulators, the
center simply decided that the regulators themselves were to
be blamed, and they were continuously changed.
With the reform process advancing in the 1980s, there
was a need for change in the political apparatus.

It was

only a start to eliminate the dominance of planned
directives.

The developments through the mid-1980s were

still insufficient concerning the emergence of market
relations.

By the end of the 1980s there was a truly

national constituency in support of reform that would open u
the economic and political system.

Consequently, in June

1987, Kadar appointed Karolyi Grosz as premier.

Grosz had

criticized the handling of the economy by the Kadarists and

25Ibid. , p. 5.

15

castigated Hungary's workers for low productivity.26

The

seventh five-year plan (1986-91) estimated that real growth
would average only 2 per cent each year.27

Because Grosz

could not make great strides as long as the Kadarist
conservatives dominated the top party and state organs, he
challenged them at a May 1988 conference.

The conference

endorsed the replacement of Kadar as first party secretary
with Grosz.

In early 1990, parliamentary elections brought

an end to almost 45 years of Communist totalitarian rule in
Hungary.

Grosz was replaced by Resno Nyers, and a special

party Congress was held to ratify the inauguration of
Hungary's first multiparty elections since 194 7.
have now taken a new path
introduction of capitalism.

Reforms

-toward the full scale
The Hungarian government

launched a campaign to privatize the country's state-owned
economy.

Although Kadar had not duplicated the Soviet

system in its entirety, he was not interested in
establishing market relations either. Much like the present
case in the Soviet Union, Kadar's policies of gradual change
went further than he ever imagined.

26Minton F. Goldman, The Soviet Union And Eastern Europe.
3rd ed. (Connecticut:
Dushkin, 1990), p. 116.
27Dawisha, p. 177.
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2.2

The Agricultural Sector

In the early 1950s, the government utilized ruthless
methods and pressure to make private farming impossible.

In

1952-53, only 1 per cent of grain was sold on the free
market.28

Before Kadar assumed power, 5,22 4 cooperatives

were founded but only represented 26 per cent of Hungarian
agriculture.29

The other 74 per cent of the cooperatives

offered their land to the state.

The Party had traditional

communist doubts about the ability and willingness of the
agricultural sector to provide industry with the support
necessitated by reform. Even more important, there was
concern about the extent of political control the leadership
could exercise over farm cooperatives.
Following the revolution in Hungary in 1956, compulsory
deliveries in agriculture were abolished, and many members
of collectives left to become private farmers.

Kadar's idea

was to invest heavily in the countryside and persuade the
peasants of the advantages of large-scale cooperative
farming.

Unlike the industrial sector of the Hungarian

economy, the agricultural sector was stripped of the
institutional foundations of the neo-Stalinist model.30
28Berend and Ranki, p. 201.
29Berend and Ranki, p. 201.
30Berend, p. 57.

In
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agriculture's case the command economy was not merely
reformed, measures were initially taken to dismantle it.
After 1956, the distinguishing feature in the
agricultural sector was the cooperative movement, which
combined individual initiative and large-scale co-operation.
The activities of the cooperatives covered everything in the
rural economy, from the repairs of equipment to the
production of crops.

The cooperatives could buy and sell

from each other at mutually acceptable prices.31

Prices

for most agricultural products reflected conditions of
supply and demand, and the cooperatives operated in a more
market-oriented environment.
Cooperative members were provided with land that they
could use as their own but could not pass on to their heirs.
Even more importantly, the Kadar regime recognized the
necessity of having cooperatives elect their leaders without
excessive interference from above.

This had been the root

cause of two out of three farmers leaving their land prior
to the establishment of Kadar's regime.
This method of agricultural reform that the Kadar
government adopted rejected the use of administrative
methods to eliminate private peasant farming.

One

innovation that had dramatic effects was share cultivation
within the cooperatives, known also as "family work
31Padma Desai, Perestroika In Perspective: The Design And
Dilemmas Of Soviet Reform (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1989), p. 36.

18

organization."32

Under this system, the land of the

cooperative was divided into shares worked as family
holdings by the cooperative members.

This program served to

foster a firm incentive plan for the peasants employed on
the cooperative. Between 1956 and 1961, gross agricultural
production increased by nearly 10 per cent.33

This

foundation in agriculture was the most important and most
effective element of the post-1956 reform policy.
It is essential to remember that this program was
implemented during a time when there was deep concern among
many government officials about adhering to the socialist
path of development.

The leadership that formulated the

agricultural policy during this period had to confront these
doctrinaire beliefs, as the following excerpt from
Kozgazdasaai Szemle demonstrates:
But as the collective farm develops rapidly, the
household plot gradually loses its significance, at
first to an absolute degree...Initially [household
farming] is also significant from the point of view of
supplying the country...In the later period, when
socialism has developed, its role in producing
commodities steadily diminishes until it finally
disappears, and its role in the members' personal
consumption gradually falls as well.34
During this period, reforms in the agricultural sector were
"sold" as an evil transition period in Hungary. There was a

32Berend, p. 95.
33Berend and Ranki, p. 233.
34Erno Csizmadia, "Transitional
Kozqazdasaqi Szemle. 1986, p. 1286.

Forms

and

Solutions,"
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large upsurge in the production and number of small and
medium-sized agricultural units during this period.
Cooperation between small producers and large agricultural
firms was strengthened, especially with regard to laborintensive products.35

These increased incentives for the

small producers resulted in production that was better
adapted to market needs, especially in regard to producing
more than one commodity.
After the introduction of the NEM in 1968, the
percentage of state-owned farms steadily declined, while the
percentage of cooperatives increased. At the same time, the
percentage of individuals employed on private farms
increased.

In fact, by 1988 seventy-five per cent of

Hungarian farms were managed by 1,3 60 independent
cooperatives, which cultivated eighty per cent of the
land.36

There were also over 100 state-owned farms that

represented only fifteen per cent of the total number of
farms.

The remaining ten per cent of the farms were

privately owned. In the five years after the introduction of
NEM, while the national economy as a whole suffered a

35Gabor Revesz, Perestroika In Eastern Europe: Hungary1s
Economic Transformation. 1945-1988 (London: Westview Press,
1990), p. 93.
36Kerpel and Young, p. 33.
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foreign trade deficit, agriculture maintained a favorable
balance of 3 billion 100 million foreign exchange forint.37
In the 197 0s, Kadar suggested the need for an
institutional convergence that would bring state and
cooperative ownership closer together to develop a
homogenous communist public ownership out of the merger of
the two.

Based on this principle, he considered it

necessary to merge the cooperative farms and form units as
large as possible.38

Nevertheless, the self-management

that was introduced earlier in the agricultural sector had
substantially contributed to the development of incentives
and awareness.

It created a vested interest in the long

term development of self-management, despite Kadar's
retrogressive policies.

Even in state-owned farms, the role

of the central administration has been smaller than in the
case of the industrial sector.
By 1975, the government was generally persuaded of the
enduring importance of both cooperatives and private
farming.

Kadar's actions attested to this by his attendance

at the 1976 Congress of Agricultural Cooperatives and his
stress upon the unity of the household plot and the
cooperative farms. The results of this reform process attest
to the progress that has occurred in the agricultural
37William F. Robinson, The Pattern Of Reform In Hungary:
A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis
(New York:
Praeger, 1973), p. 109.
38Berend, p. 220.
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sector.

Gross production in the industrial sector declined

from 7.2 to 2.6 per cent between 1971 and 1981.

In the

meantime, gross production in the agricultural sector
increased from 4.2 to 6.7 per cent.39
Throughout the 1970s, Hungary's agricultural growth was
second in the world only to that of Holland.

As Swain

recently observed, Hungarian agriculture can be regarded as
a remarkably fruitful symbiosis between "socialist wage
labour" and traditional "family labour."40

To the extent

that acceptance of market forces is a key measure of the
reform of neo-Stalinist economies, the Hungarian agriculture
sector can be said to have been "reformed.1,41

In fact, by

1987, private farms were double the number of state farms,
and there were three times as many cooperatives as state
farms in Hungary. By this time, Hungary was able not only to
supply the country with food, but its exports rose from 11.4
per cent in 1971 to 14.2 per cent in 1987 .42

This was

quite an achievement, given that Hungary was the only net
food exporter in the Warsaw Pact.

39Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 33.
40Norman Swain, Collective Farms Which Work?
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 34-5.
41Griffith, p. 223.
42Kerpel and Young, p. 34.

(Cambridge:
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2.3

The Industrial Sector

In the decade after the revolution of 1956, the reforms
introduced in the industrial sector were more limited than
those in the agricultural sector.

The central focus of

industrial reforms has been the socialist enterprise.

It is

the basic production unit of industry that is state-owned
and has been rigidly controlled by state bureaucrats who
know little about production and economics.43
However, from 1956 to 1968, the number of centrally
prescribed indicators for enterprises was reduced, and
profit sharing with workers was introduced.44

The reforms

did not greatly advance the efficiency of enterprise
operations.

The managers of state-owned enterprises had

very little control over which products they produced, how
they were produced, or how they would be marketed, either
domestically or internationally.

Under such a rigid,

inflexible system, there were few incentives for innovation
or the efficient use of scarce resources.45

Nevertheless,

43John McMillan, John Whalley, and Lijing Zhu, "The Impact
of
China's Economic Reforms
On Agricultural Productivity
Growth," Journal of Political Economy. August 1989, vol. 97,
pp. 781-2.
44Peter Van Ness, ed.,Market Reforms
Societies; Comparing China
and Hungary
Rienner, 1989), p. 53.
45Naylor, p. 57.

In Socialist
(London;
Lynne
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Hungary underwent relatively rapid industrialization based
principally on the development of heavy industry.

This

progress was achieved at a high cost to economic efficiency
and led to imbalances in the economy, which hindered the
growth of export sectors.
With the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in
1968, enterprises were expected to work out their own plans
and arrange for their own input supplies and output
marketing in an attempt to reinstate a form of market
mechanism into the economy.

The NEM instituted a policy

whereby enterprise management was given discretionary power
over short-term production and sales schedules. At least
theoretically, the reforms reinstated the profit incentive
and introduced decentralized planning and control into the
state-owned enterprises.

Macro-economic planning went on

very much as before, but enterprise activity was to be
guided by so-called economic regulators:

wage policy,

profits taxation, price policy, credit policy, and so o n / 6
However, in practice, even after the NEM got under way, most
prices remained centrally determined;

indeed, prices seldom

reflected either production costs or supply and demand/7
The vast majority of enterprises remained socially owned,
with the state making strategic business decisions.
A6Stephan Feuchtwang, Athar Hussain, and Thierry Pairault,
Transforming China1s Economy In The Eighties
(London:
Westview Press, 1988), p. 54.
47Griffith, p. 223.
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Furthermore, there was some decentralization of
authority in relation to foreign trade transactions as well
as investment, but in both these areas the center chose to
retain substantial control.

The strict division of labor

between big firms and their subsidiaries, as well as the
high degree of industrial concentration and resultant lack
of competition remained essentially the same.48
Furthermore, decisions regarding the wage structure and
pricing policy remained highly centralized. Thus, even
before the retrenchment of the 1970s, success in this sector
was limited.

Most large industrial monopolies remained

intact and economic regulators simply replaced directives.
The early 1970s represented a period of limited
recentralization, combined with rapid growth based on heavy
foreign borrowing.

Output of socialist industry grew at an

average annual rate of 6.4 per cent during 1971-75, but
slowed down during 1976-80 to 3.4 per cent.49

The growth

of heavy industry was faster than that of light industry
during both periods.

Large industrial enterprises reacted

to the deterioration in their relative economic positions
and to the decline in the prestige of their managers and
workers by criticizing the impact of the reform measures.50

48Brada and Dobozi, p. 22.
49Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 5.
50Ness, p. 57.
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Consequently, the party decided to provide "state
protection" to six of the country's largest industrial
firms, meaning that they would be saved from bankruptcy
irrespective of performance.

In further revision of the

NEM, the trend toward decentralization was reversed in 1973
when fifty of the largest enterprises were ordered to absorb
a number of smaller factories.

Although the Kadar

leadership recognized that some of the country's smaller
firms were doing well under NEM, it claimed that the large
enterprises suffered because of unfair competition by
smaller firms that offered flexible assignments and bonuses
to managers.
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a renewed
encouragement of individuals to engage in private activity
outside of the enterprise.

However, as of 1984, only

164,900 people were employed in these associations.51

To

apply to industry the positive experiences gained in
developing small-scale agricultural production, the
Hungarian government decided in 1982 to implement a new law
in the handicraft industry.

It provided that private

enterprises that employed fewer than 30 workers would be
allowed to operate. The National Planning Office indicated
that this new wave of economic reforms was intended "to
encourage autonomous, entrepreneur-type, dynamic, and
innovative managers who are able to mobilize the internal
51Kerpel and Young, p. 39.
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resources of the economy and make enterprises, collectives,
and workers interested in the improvement of the efficiency
of management."52
As with other elements of the reform process, the
pioneering experiences in the agricultural sector led to the
drawing of conclusions about the industrial sector.

This

connection was openly expressed by Ferenc Havasi in his
speech proposing the Central Committee's reform resolution:
Will company autonomy, its extent, and the
ensuring on our part of extensive rights to companies
of disposal over property not lead to a weakening of
the central state intention, to an undesirable
strengthening of group interest? In answering this
question it is worth referring to the experiences of
the Hungarian cooperative movement... Today we already
know how this greater independence furthered the
emergence of responsible entrepreneurial behavior in
economic activity...It was in this sector that a few
commendable methods of economic activity emerged and
became general practice...These, now that the system of
management is being further developed, we want to
utilize in a broader sphere.53
It was also that the price, wage, credit, and tax
systems were too complex, and were subject to bargaining
between enterprises and the central authorities, resulting
in frequent rule changes.54

Large industrial firms were

not as specialized as smaller firms, and thus suffered from

52National Planning Office, "Guidelines of The Further
Development of The Hungarian Economic Management System,"
1985, pp. 3-4.
53Ferenc Havasi, "A Gazdasagiranyitas Tovabbfejlesztese
(The Further Development of Economic Management) , Kozaazdasagi
Szemle. no. 5, 1984, p. 21.
54Ness, p. 71.
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slow changes in their response to state orders and high unit
costs of production.

The technological revolution in the

1980s demanded a division of labor among smaller and more
diversified production units.
Private and cooperative enterprises were definitely
more profit-oriented, especially over the long-term, than
state enterprises.

For example, total industrial production

in Hungary grew by 3.7 per cent in 1987, but the production
of industrial cooperatives grew by 9.9 per cent.55
Furthermore, the above-mentioned results secured by smallscale agricultural production could hardly be sustained
without adequate mechanization and modernization.
As a result of this, by the late 1980s, most medium
sized industrial firms and some large state-owned
enterprises became controlled by enterprise councils.

These

were composed of elected representatives of the enterprises
employees and representatives of management.

Although the

managing director remained responsible for day-to-day
operational decisions, the council exercised property rights
transferred to it by the state.

By the end of 198 6, nearly

half of the 720 state-owned industrial enterprises were
operating under some form of self-management.

55Kerpel and Young, p. 39.
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2.4

Conclusions

The changes in the industrial sector of the Hungarian
economy reveal that although there was decentralization of
decision-making regarding current inputs and outputs before
1988, there was virtually no institutional political change
to accompany this reform.

This impeded the progress of the

reform in a number of ways, as well as facilitated some
recentralization in the 1970s in response to the economy's
problems.56

Hungary was hoping that the outside world

could spur domestic investment, but the lesson has been
provided that an economic base for these activities must be
developed. The situation in Hungary provided the lesson for
China and the Soviet Union that substantial decentralization
of current production decisions to enterprises is not
sufficient to improve the economy's domestic performance.
The most difficult problem is for the political leadership
to restrain their persistently excessive demand for foreign
investment in their country.
Hungary also demonstrated the importance of not
providing subsidies to inefficient state-owned enterprises.
Not only do these protected enterprises continue to bring
losses, they are unable to compete in the international
arena.

Like Hungarian managers, Soviet and Chinese managers

56Feuchtwang, et al., p. 54.
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must compete in the international market without being
rescued by the central leadership.
In Hungary as in China and the Soviet Union, most of
the central administrators wanted as little change as
possible in the structure of the economy.

For example,

Kadar, Deng Xiaoping, and Gorbachev had to confront
political resistance to agricultural reform.

Fundamental

reform in this sector necessarily deprived a large share of
the party apparatus of the reason for its existence.
Hungary provided the lesson that political and economic
reform must therefore occur simultaneously.

The

agricultural sector showed that if the ministries are not
effectively deprived of their detailed supervision of
enterprises, the economy is unlikely to recover or
strengthen.
The years following the introduction of the New
Economic Mechanism in 1968 taught Hungarian political
reformers that even incomplete changes may be better than no
changes at all.

Following this period, any growth in the

Hungarian economy came from formal or informal private
activities.

Although the private sector was initially very

limited in Hungary, the emphasis given to cooperatives in
the agricultural sector helped to lay a foundation for
improved economic performance.
During this learning process of reform, in many
instances "brakes" that were built into the economic system
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were more powerful than the throttles.57

Various reform

efforts have attempted to abolish the system of mandatory
directives from above, but history provided the lesson that
Hungary needed to concentrate on the elimination of the
hierarchical system of relations between the bureaucracy and
the enterprises.
Agricultural reforms cleared a path towards this goal,
but living with two systems meant that retreats were as
frequent as progressions.

Unlike the industrial sector, the

agricultural sector had a small number of state-owned
enterprises surrounded by a large number of more
competitive, more market- and profit-oriented cooperatives
and private household firms.58

From 1979 through the

1980s, economic policy in Hungary sought to correct the
imbalances associated with earlier growth by emphasizing the
flow of resources into the agricultural sector.
The examples of Hungary and (more recently) China show
that market- and incentive-oriented reforms work better-and yield results more quickly
than in the industrial.

in the agricultural sector

This advantage results because

there are no monopolistic producers in agriculture and
viable incentive systems are therefore easier to introduce.
Investment decisions also tend to be easier.

Partly for

57Kerpel and Young, p. 22.
58Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., Remaking The Economic
Institutions
of Socialism:
China and Eastern Europe
(California:
Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 53.
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these reasons, the central authorities were more willing to
release their bureaucratic grip on agriculture than on the
industrial sector.
In any case, the most fundamental lesson of the
Hungarian experience was to reveal how difficult and timeconsuming it can be to transform a neo-Stalinist economy.
There was often a lack of consistent adherence to the
original reform plans.

When new circumstances emerged in

and outside of the country, the political leadership failed
to respond in a flexible way.

Frequent rule changes often

caused confusion among workers and managers who did not know
how to respond to the changing rules of the game.59
However, as the next chapter demonstrates, this does
not always have to be the case.

In contrast to Hungary,

China's reforms are being achieved in a much shorter period
of time.

Whereas Hungary's successful agricultural reforms

preceded industrial reforms by a decade, in China the two
stages have proceeded together.

The apparently quick

success of the new arrangements in Chinese agriculture,
which improved both the food supply and the supply of raw
materials for industry, was the main reason agricultural
reforms were extended into Chinese urban areas in the
1980s.60

59Ness, p. 210.
60Feuchtwang et al., p. 57.
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Not unlike Hungary, China in the 1980s arrived at the
state of neither plan nor market, with the market striving
to dominate agriculture and the plan still largely dominant
in the industrial sector.

As Revesz has suggested:

It is worth noting that the very successful
changes in China in the 1980s were in many ways based
on the Hungarian experience;
likewise, Gorbachev's
perestroika and the subsequent economic renewal in
several Eastern European countries have numerous points
in common with events that began in Hungary some twenty
years ago.61

61Revesz, pp. ix-x.

CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA

3.1

Introduction

This chapter will focus on an analysis of economic
reforms in China since 1978.

A complex set of political and

economic reasons lay behind the profound changes in China!s
development strategy at the end of 1978.

Among them were

poor economic results that had resulted from previous reform
efforts, the inertia of the middle bureaucracy, and
divergences among the leadership.

The reforms, implemented

under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, aimed to reduce state
control over the economy, open the way to economic
interactions with the rest of the world, and replace mass
mobilization with personal incentive as the chief motivator
of human effort.62

Analyzing the economic effects of

reforms in the agricultural and industrial sectors reveals
that the former have fared more favorably over the past
decade than the latter.

62John Woodruff, China In Search of Its Future: Years of
Great Reform. 1982-87
(Seattle:
University of Washington
Press, 1989), p. 14.
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The reform process in China attempted to overhaul the
economic system.

The beginning of economic reforms dated

back to 1958 when the government first decided to relinquish
some of its central powers of economic control.

At that

time, 87 per cent of the Chinese state enterprises, which
had been managed by central government ministries, were
turned over to local provinces.63

However, that change in

management simply shifted the level of administration, and
the enterprises remained as appendages of local ministries.
In 1958, part of the reason the economy faltered was the
haste in collectivizing the ownership of land, farming
tools, and agricultural animals.

There was also a lopsided

stress in China, Hungary, and the Soviet Union on developing
heavy industry at the expense of agriculture.

The

consequent failures that resulted from these policies
dampened’the people*s enthusiasm and hope for any realistic
improvement in their standard of living.
In 1970, another economic reform attempt took place in
China.

Of a total 400,000 state-run enterprises, the

managerial control of 2,000 large enterprises was again
transferred to the local ministries.

Much like the

situation in 1958, the controlling power of the enterprises
was shared by the central government and the local
ministries.

Both of these economic reform efforts by the

63George C. Wang, ed., Economic Reform
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 1.
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political leadership failed to restructure the economy,
i.e., to allow an enterprise to operate as an independent
economic entity, responsible for its own profits and losses.
Although the Cultural Revolution exalted the role of
the masses and made "serve the people" its central slogan,
ironically, it was associated with an intensification of
hierarchy on the one hand and a slighting of the masses'
material needs on the other.6A

At the end of 1976, China

passed through a phase of struggle between "reformers," led
by Deng Xiaoping, and "moderates," led by Hua Guofeng.

The

reformers advocated a path for China that was diametrically
opposed to that of the Cultural Revolution, while the
moderates sought to find a mean between the two positions.
At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central
Committee in December 1978, the reformers won out decisively
and their program was formally adopted as the national
development guide.

The new Chinese leaders recognized that

previous reform efforts had undertaken the wrong path
towards economic restructuring.

Deng Xiaoping attempted to

shift attention from the political struggle to economic
construction.
Under the neo-Stalinist system that had existed before,
the decision-making authority of enterprises was extremely
limited, and there was little incentive to assume initiative

6AVictor D. Lippit, The Economic Development Of China
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), p. 120.
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even when it was possible.

The result was the full range of

problems that are presently confronting the Soviet Union:
declining economic efficiency reflected in increasing
capital requirements per unit of output, poor quality, and
severe underutilization of capacity due to procurement
difficulties, among others.
In the political debate that arose in the Chinese
leadership between devoting investment towards the
industrial and agricultural sectors, agriculture won, but
not without a struggle.

The long lead period of projects,

their often high costs, waste, and low rate of profitability
were the four evils that burdened the industrial sector in
1978.

Furthermore, statistics show that in 1949,

agriculture accounted for 70 per cent of the gross value of
industry and agriculture.

By contrast, in 1979, the gross

value declined to 29.7 per cent.55
The market economy, which had been systematically
destroyed during the 1950s, came to be seen as indispensable
for reducing the discontinuities and waste that marked the
bureaucratic management of the economy.

Unfortunately, the

overwhelming majority of leaders at the intermediate or
local levels were not prepared for the changes of economic
policy.
This was partly due to the fact that, like the
Hungarian and Soviet systems, the Chinese system of
65Wang, p. 14.

industrial management bears the imprint of state control
over the economy.

For instance, although factory managers

now have the power to appoint and dismiss administrative
staff, it remains the case that an industrial unit is not
free to hire or fire employees in terms of its economic
objectives.

Instead, it still must submit its decisions to

the labor bureau.

Consequently, most factories have

remained at the "big and all-embracing" stage since they
were first established.
The priorities of the 1950s had been heavy industry,
light industry, and agriculture, in that order.

Although

this ordering was formally reversed in 1970, with
agriculture nominally given top priority, implementation of
the new ordering was not rigorously pursued until after
1978.

In the agricultural sector, real per capita income

doubled between 1978 and 19 8 3 .66

During this same period,

output in this sector increased by over 61 per cent.67

In

the case of the Chinese economic recovery in the first half
of the 1980s, as well as the improvements in the Hungarian
economy under the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), it was rural
revitalization that dominated.

The ongoing economic reforms

in China, which began in agriculture, are now slowly
spreading to manufacturing and other sectors.

66Lippit, p. 123.
67Mcmillan et al., pp. 781-2.
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3.2

The Agricultural Sector

Mao Zedong assumed power in China in 1949, and the
first people's commune was set up in April 1958.

They grew

to include 98 per cent of all rural households.68

Farmers

gradually adjusted to the fact that communal farming meant
communal rewards.

The communal system was a thrust by the

state to establish full control over the countryside.
The U. S. Department of Agriculture recently
suggested that there was a decrease in the agricultural
production of grain, cotton, oilseeds, and sugarcane after
the introduction of communal farming.69

This was due

primarily to the extreme rapidity of the move to
communization that precluded the opportunity to correct
problems that arose in the transitional period.

One of

these major problems was that in most cases, food and income
were distributed according to "need," and there was little
inducement to work for the collectivity.

The communes were

expected to serve as -a model for the agricultural sector.
From the beginning, however, production teams had
difficulty in motivating farmers to work hard because the
farmers did not receive the value of the marginal product of
their labor under the payment system.
68Woodruff, pp. 54-5.
69Lippit, p. 174.

By the time Deng
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Xiaoping came to power in 1978, the politically inspired
measure of offering the workers in groups increased wages
and bonuses to win their confidence and allegiance was
exhausted.

In other words, by commanding farmers to produce

as teams and not pay them according to their individual
labor productivity, the commune failed to effectively manage
the production of farm products.70
Beginning in the province of Sichuan, the traditional
breadbasket and rice bowl in southwest China, the changes in
the late 1970s reversed virtually everything Mao had stood
for in China's countryside.

The government under Deng

Xiaoping began shifting away from a state regulated
agricultural system towards a system that permitted farmers
to produce whatever they wanted in response to government
prices and local market conditions.71 This decentralization
of agricultural decision making along with the return to
individual family farming under the "household
responsibility system" have been the most notable reforms in
the agricultural sector.
The household responsibility system has led to the
virtual disappearance of the communes.
the collective

Under this system,

assigned plots of land to individual peasant

70Gregory C. Chow, The Chinese Economy
and Row, 1985), p. 48.

(New York:

Harper

71China Daily. October 9, 1984, in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), October 9, 1984, p. K 1.
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families

not to own, but to farm.72

The thrust of the

reforms was to tie incomes as closely as possible to
individual effort and productive accomplishment, to make
individuals responsible for their own performance.

Since

1985, when the state stopped mandatory purchases of
agricultural products, peasants in theory have been free to
decide what crops to grow and whether to sell their crops to
the government or on the open market.73
These new policies in the countryside have been
designed to tap enormous latent labor potential.

In

essence, reforms in the agricultural sector have changed
peasant production from a collective to a private practice.
The agricultural reforms have had an enormous impact on
rural output and productivity.

For example, agricultural

output grew at an average annual rate of over 10 per cent
between 1978 and 1987 compared with 4 per cent in the late
1960s and 1970s.

Furthermore, the productivity of both land

and labor since 1978 has risen at twice the average rate
between 1953 and 1978.74

Thus, the reforms of the

72Harry Harding, China 1s Second Revolution: Reform After
Mao (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p.
103.
73Richard Feinberg, et al., Economic Reform In Three
Giants: U.S. Foreign Policy and The USSR. China, and India
(Washington, D.C.:
Overseas Development Council, 1990), p.
78.
74Lee Travers, "Post-1978 Rural Economic Policy and
Peasant Income in China," China Quarterly, no. 98, June 1984,
pp. 245-46.
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agricultural sector in China have demonstrated the success
of a strategy based on mobilizing individual initiative
through market incentives.
The growth of agricultural output during this period
was not due to a sudden increase in the supply of fixed
capital inputs.

Rather, it occurred mainly because of an

extremely rapid growth of agricultural labor productivity.
It seems clear that the new incentive effects of the
responsibility system have yielded these large benefits.
Some scholars have suggested that the same benefits would
occur if similar reforms were

applied to the industrial

sector.75
The major dilemma that presently confronts China in
regard to the agricultural sector is how to sustain the
momentum generated by the first phase of reforms by
generating sufficient new investment in agriculture.

The

allocation of agricultural land to peasants shifts
responsibility to them to reinvest the resources that can
keep the reform movement moving forward.

Uncertain of the

long-term fate of the household responsibility system,
peasants have been reluctant to make permanent, nonmobile
investments in their land, because of fear that improvements
would be confiscated if their plots were later reabsorbed
into a collective farm.76
75McMillan, et al., p. 783.
76Harding, p. 107.
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The success of the responsibility system that was
introduced in this sector links income much more closely
with individual work effort than the commune system, and
encourages entrepreneurial initiatives by the peasantry.

By

the late 1980s, the responsibility system was being applied
throughout the Chinese countryside.

During this period,

agricultural production grew by an average of 7.9 per cent
per annum.77

3.3

The Industrial Sector

The post-Mao economic reforms in the industrial sector
have given managers greater independence in running their
enterprises, the ability to retain more financial resources
and decide on their use, and more responsibility for their
enterprises' profitability.
conducted whereby enterprises

In 1979> an experiment was
retained a portion of their

profits, but they could not rely on the state to cover their
expenses or losses.

This experiment brought about an

increase in the income of the state, the enterprises, and
the workers, and better goal congruence among all three
parties.

Nevertheless, the attempts to promote greater

autonomy in enterprise management have been among the most
difficult to implement effectively.
77Lippit, p. 123.
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Despite frequent discussions of a market economy and
the increase in private entrepreneurship, state-owned
enterprises still dominate the industrial sector, and the
government exercises a powerful influence over prices,
investment, and allocation.78

The following excerpt by

Zhou Xulian in 1982 is still indicative of some of the major
problems that continue to confront Chinese economic
reforms:
The system of economic administration practiced in
our country today was adopted from the Soviet Union in
the early 1950s.
The particular characteristic of this
administrative system is to stress the extremely
centralized leadership of the economy by the state.
The state directs and manages the affairs of stateowned enterprises, large or small.
It centrally
determines the prices of commodities.
It takes a
large fraction of the profits of the enterprises and
subsidizes their losses. Under this administrative
system an enterprise is not a self-propelling entity
but rather a bead of the abacus of the state
administration, lacking a necessary sense of
independence and strong economic motivation.79
It was recognized from the beginning of these economic
reforms that coordination of agricultural reforms and
industrial reforms would be problematic at the national
level, although, in the announced policy, modernizing the
agricultural sector of the economy would require a larger
portion of industrial inputs.
The imbalances affecting the industrial sector proved
to be greater in the late 1970s than they had been in 1958.

78Harding, p. 4.
79Chow, p. 147.
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The political leadership recognized that the shortage of
consumer goods and the stagnation in housing construction,
among other problems, worsened the social malaise.
was a felt need to reverse priorities.

There

This was prompted by

a survey by the Ministry of Light Industry which revealed
that an investment of 10,000 yuan created 94 jobs in heavy
industry, 257 in light industry, and 800 in handicrafts.80
The same report also showed that there was a low rate of
profitability in all of these areas.

As the output of the

industrial sector fell in the late 1970s, the Chinese
leadership devoted increased funds to the agricultural
sector.
In the past, enterprises handed over profits at the end
of the fiscal year, once production costs had been paid.

In

June of 1983, however, a new system of accounting was
instituted.

Under this arrangement, enterprises moved to a

profit-based accounting system under which they paid regular
taxes to the central authorities on production profits.

The

central authorities have continually stressed that they
intend to phase out enterprises that do not operate at a
profit. However, this has still not occurred throughout much
of China.

There is still centralized allocation of

investment in human resources and raw materials in "critical
areas" of industry.

80Feuchtwang et al., p. 108.
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There has been political debate in the Chinese
leadership regarding the role of small-scale private
businesses and medium-scale cooperatively owned factories.
It would appear that small, private cooperatives and
village-run factories could provide an impetus to
production.

However, this reform has been subjected to very

strict limits.

For instance, despite the political and

economic disruption that occurred periodically in the last
three decades in China, there was resistance to change on
the part of central planners and enterprise management.
i

Some planners and other political officials look back to the
1950s and feel that the centralized planning model can be
restored.

Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping had to confront the

fact that China's present economic success makes the case
for extension of radical reform from agriculture to industry
seem less imperative than it appeared for Hungary.

What

makes the argument more difficult for Deng Xiaoping is that
agriculture supplies roughly 75 per cent of the raw
materials for the industrial sector.81
It cannot be dismissed that there has been the painful
realization that the country*s industries are still wholly
unsuited to cope with the modern world.82

In addition,

each factory is part of an interrelated system of
81Allen S. Whiting and Robert F. Dernberger, China1s
Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development In The PostMao Era
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 148.
82Woodruff, pp. 62-3.

commercial, transportation, and production sectors.

The

Party, the state, and the workers’ congress all retain
significant residual powers that limit the autonomy of
factory managers.83

These factories are still viewed in

essentially political, rather than economic terms.

The

reason for this is that during the Maoist period,
accumulation rates were high and investment was devoted to
the expansion of heavy industry at the sacrifice of
consumption.

This served the interests of the

administrative-bureaucratic hierarchy at the expense of the
ordinary working people. The party-run distribution and
decision-making apparatus still assumes precedence over
production decisions.

In practice, this has usually meant

that all significant decisions in a Chinese factory still
must ultimately be approved, if not actually made, by the
factory's party secretary.84
The proposed workers' self-management system implies
enterprise operational autonomy in relation to the state.
Proponents of workers' self-management invariably support
alternative forms of public ownership to replace or modify
state ownership.

The major impediment to change has been

that most political officials in China still feel that
average industrial workers are not competent to manage
83Harding, p. 113.
84Liu Guoguang and Wang Xiangming, "A Study of The Speed
and Balance of China's Economic Development." Social Sciences
in China, no. r, 1980, pp. 6-7.

47

complex, modern industries.

The wide gulf between the

advocates and opponents of workers' self-management in China
reflects a conflict with the neo-Stalinist model that
reformers in the industrial sector have been unable to
overcome.
With workers' jobs guaranteed and wages independent of
productivity in the neo-Stalinist model, the management has
difficulty in motivating the labor force.

It's main goal

has not been to maximize profits, but to meet the production
targets set by the planning authority and there is a lack of
incentive for the management to increase outputs beyond the
targeted amounts.85

This type of administrative planning

and control is bureaucratic socialism par excellence.
Industry still remains structured in such a way that it is
mainly turning out products such as spare parts for its own
maintenance, rather than for agriculture.

There is still a

lack of coordination between the sectors.

The long

obsession in China, Hungary, and the Soviet Union with heavy
industry has effectively distorted the production structure.

3.4

The Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

The introduction of SEZs was one of the most important
innovations of the Chinese economic reform program.
85Chow, p. 48.

SEZs
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were conceived as instruments— small, specialized and
limited in scope— to be laboratories in which different
doses of market economy planning could be experimented with.
SEZs were not organized, with planned inputs and planned
production outputs tied to government targets, but if they
were found to work, they could be adapted and imported into
the socialist economy of China.
China's SEZs have no counterparts in other socialist
countries at the present time.

Their objective was not only

to create jobs and generate foreign exchange but to build,
from the ground up, completely modern cities that were also
comprehensive economic development areas, with a high
proportion of technology-intensive, knowledge-intensive, and
capital-intensive enterprises.86
It has been suggested that the SEZs were established to
give China a base for importing new managerial skills and
technologies, for "learning the capitalist" way.87

Radical

measures such as the abolition of planned targets could be
tested in this setting.

Also, SEZs were to serve as a link

to the outside world by stimulating foreign investment and
trade.

This assumption seems correct given their

geographical proximity to ocean transport routes.

86Jantes M. Ethridge,
China1s Unfinished
Problems And Prospects Since Mao (San Francisco:
and Periodicals, 1988), p. 135.

Revolution:
China Books

87Michael Oborne, China1s Special Economic Zones
OECD, 1986), p. 152.

(Paris:
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The SEZs were intensively debated in 1978, when the
political transition of power was occurring in China.

Hua

Guofeng (then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist
Party) presented a Ten Year Plan for the economy, with an
emphasis on planned targets.

By 1979, the focus of policy

began to turn, as a detailed rethinking of the Ten Year Plan
occurred among political leaders.
Deng Xiaoping became convinced of the need for much
more sweeping reforms than Hua Guofeng was willing to
undertake.

Most important among these reforms, agriculture

was to be emphasized over heavy industry.

Readjustments and

reform in China's rural and urban economic development
required removal of the rigid central control and
egalitarian ideology.

The principal aim was to decentralize

decision making, and this process was to begin with the
SEZs.

Hua Guofeng was subsequently removed as the nation's

Premier, principally because of his role in formulating the
Ten Year Plan.
During the period September 1979 to August 1980, the
Fifth National People's Congress approved the Regulations on
Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province.

Article 4

focuses on the conditions of the SEZs:
In the special zones, investors are offered a wide
scope of operation, favourable conditions for such
operation are created and stable business sites are
guaranteed.
All items of industry, agriculture,
tourism, housing and construction, research and
manufacture involving high technologies and techniques
that have positive significance in international
economic co-operation and technical exchanges as well
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as other trades of common interest to investors and the
Chinese side, can be established with foreign
investment or in joint venture with Chinese
investment.88
Although SEZs served as a testing ground for market forces,
it is still important to remember that they are not
integrated into the national economy.

Since market forces

are only operating in these isolated communities, there have
been problems associated with the implementation of this
experiment elsewhere.89

The most important is the fact

that SEZs may simply not function as efficiently if they are
integrated into the national economy as they do when left to
operate in their own isolated worlds.
At this time, I do not expect any new SEZs to be
created in China.

This is partly because attempts are still

being made to streamline existing ones.

SEZs have more

horizontal or decentralized integration between government
and planning structures than the vertical or centralized
integration that has characterized Chinese society as a
whole.

This is still a major obstacle that must be overcome

before they are integrated into Chinese society.
For this and other reasons, it appears that Chinese
leaders are interested in continuing their present policy of

88,,Laws and Regulations Concerning External Economic
Relations,"
Guide To Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.
Hong Kong, 1983, p. 187.
89Wang Dacheng, "Reforming The Foreign Trade Structure,"
Beiiina Review, vol. 27, no. 43, 1985, pp. 20-1.
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devoting resources to the agricultural and industrial
sectors which are considered to be the core of the Chinese
economy, rather than to these peripheral regions.

But, some

of the policies that underlay SEZ functioning have been
applied to the wider segment of the Chinese economy.

For

instance, some provinces have been granted expanded
authority over trade and investment decisions, without
having to secure central approval.90
Gradually, however, Chinese leaders have learned that
the zones' lack of physical facilities, shortages of skilled
labor, and relative isolation from the rest of the country
have produced high economic and social costs for the
country.91

For instance, because the average wage in SEZs

is about 50 per cent higher than in the rest of China, more
foreign companies have recently tended to invest outside of
the SEZs.

Additionally, over 40 per cent of foreign

investment projects in the SEZs are not manufacturing but
tourist or commercial projects.

As a result, the SEZs still

greatly depend on China's domestic market.

If the SEZs are

expected to continue to provide a window to the world and
act as a door through which new technologies and skills can

90Christopher Howe and Y. Y. Kueh, "China's International
Trade: Policy and Organization Change and Their Place in The
Economic Readjustment,"
China Quarterly, no. 100, December
1984, p. 813.
91Harding, p. 169.
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pass to China, they must move into a more market regulated,
rather than experimentally isolated, environment.

3.5

Conclusions

Reformers in socialist countries have discovered that a
society that becomes accustomed to predictable stagnation
often finds it difficult to adjust to a situation that is
more dynamic, but also more uncertain.

The result of Mao's

Cultural Revolution, which was launched in 1966, resulted in
an actual fall in output a year later.

The 1970s saw order

restored and central planning re-established;

but serious

political conflict within the leadership continued to have
adverse effects on the economy.
Moderates thought in terms of a long-term development
plan while the left attacked planning as a whole and
criticized proposals to use China's resources to pay for
imported goods.

Only Mao's death in 197 6 allowed for the

institution of a new program that recognized the necessity
of having agricultural reforms precede industrial reforms.
Over 80 per cent of the materials used in light industry in
China come from agriculture.92

The products produced by

light industry in turn are major components in consumer

92Wang, p. 64.
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goods, and therefore are intimately connected with the
standard of living.
As the analysis above has suggested, there remain some
major differences between reform measures in the
agricultural and industrial sectors that have fostered the
success of the former over the latter.

Consequently, the

previous one-sided emphasis on heavy industry in China is
being corrected.

For example, just a year after the post-

Mao leadership came to power, light industry grew at a
faster pace than heavy industry.

This decreased emphasis

upon heavy industry has coincided with changes in
agricultural policy.

The state has exempted agricultural

taxes for rural production brigades that have low incomes
and reduced industrial levies for enterprises run by
people's communes.
Once an independent farm household is asked to pay a
fixed amount dependent on the productivity of the land it
uses, the profit of the farm will largely reflect its
efficiency rather than the possibly low costs of the
material inputs.93

Another major difference is that the

livelihood of the members of a production unit in the
agricultural sector depends on the output of the unit,
whereas the incomes of the managers and workers of a stateowned industrial enterprise are hardly affected by its
output or profit.
93Chow, pp. 153-54.
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Certain key enterprises and major products that are
vital to the economy (like coal, steel, and machine
building) are difficult to seize from the grasp of mandatory
state planning.94

Nevertheless, given the low productivity

and poor quality of output that has characterized this
sector of the economy, history provides the lesson that
encouraging initiative in smaller enterprises certainly
could not worsen the current situation.

However, simply

separating the government from the internal decision-making
apparatus of enterprises will not be sufficient.

There must

be decentralized linkages between enterprises without state
interference.
As the last chapter demonstrated, Hungary is a
relatively more advanced, industrialized socialist country
than China.

Despite all of its recent successes, China

remains a predominantly agricultural society.

However, in

both China and Hungary, it became apparent that the neoStalinist economic model had such severe shortcomings that
beyond a certain point it retarded rather than promoted
further economic development.

Even more importantly, the

Chinese have taken less than ten years to replicate what
required thirty years to implement in Hungary.95
However, despite the introduction of SEZs on a limited
scale, China is still poorly integrated in the world
94Ness, p. 141.
95Naylor, p. 90.

55

economy.

It remains self-sufficient in essential materials,

and the arguments for reform based on foreign trade
efficiency, which were so important in Hungary, have carried
little weight in China.

The SEZs provided the lesson that

it is necessary to become connected to the world market
economy.

More favorably, however, they provided evidence

that experiments with market forces are possible in a
centralized environment, and this is a lesson that could be
adopted in the Soviet Union today.
The examples of reform in the agricultural sector and
the success of the SEZs attests to the new entrepreneurial
energies that have been unleashed.

At the same time, by not

transforming the system of socialist ownership in the
industrial sector, the current situation testifies to the
problems of partial reform.

Chinese economic reform

provides the lesson to the Soviet Union that although reform
can begin in the agricultural sector, it must not be
emphasized entirely in that sector.

Hungary, China, and the

Soviet Union already have demonstrated the problems with
overemphasizing a particular sector in the past— namely,
industry.

The issue in China, as well as in Hungary, and

the Soviet Union, is not whether to devote all of its
resources to any particular sector.

Instead, at least in

the case of Hungary and China, beginning reforms in the
agricultural sector appear to have resulted in a higher
standard of living and popular support for economic reforms.
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Given a conducive political environment for such reforms,
the same lessons may be applied in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1985

4.1

Introduction

Soviet leaders have been willing to tolerate some
economic deviation from the neo-Stalinist model, as long as
it was not off the "road to socialism."96

As the previous

chapters demonstrated, the emphasis upon agricultural
reforms in Hungary and China initially fared more favorably
than industrial reforms.

However, in the Soviet Union,

Gorbachev chose to do the reverse by emphasizing industrial
reforms.

This chapter will analyze the economic reform

attempts in the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power in 1985, in order to determine the reasons for this
policy reversal, and also assess how far he has retreated
from the neo-Stalinist model.
The long-term decline in the growth rate of the Soviet
economy has proved to be the most pressing problem facing
the Soviet leadership.

This decline has been reflected in

96Peter Zwick, National
Press, 1983), pp. 221-30.
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continued low productivity in agriculture and industry, a
lag in the advanced technological sector, a decline in
capital investments, and a decline in raw materials and
energy resources.97

The economic growth rate was 6 per

cent per year in the 1950s, less than 4 per cent in the
1960s and 1970s, and about 3 per cent in the 1980s.98

In

addition, whereas national income grew by 7.2 per cent in
the 19 60s, its growth decreased to 5 per cent during the
1970s and declined even further in the 1980s, falling to its
lowest levels since World War II in 1984 (2.4 per cent).99
These figures illustrate the dimensions of the economic
problems confronting the Soviet Union.
By the end of the Brezhnev era in 1982, a variety of
forces were working against the continued power of the neoStalinist bureaucracy.

The cultivation of modernization,

the expansion of the intelligentsia, and the need to rely on
its expertise all made constant and detailed political
interference counterproductive.100

Furthermore, it

97Arnold Horelick, "Policy Implications Of Change in The
Soviet Union," Rand/UCLA Report. May 1989, p. 262.
98Lippit, p. 201.
"Jane S. Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation: Issues
In Soviet Domestic Policy
(New York:
Paragon House, 1989),
p. 247.
100Robert V. Daniels, Is Russia Reformable? Change and
Resistance From Stalin to Gorbachev (London: Westview Press,
1988) , p. 116.
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appeared that the conservatism of the Brezhnev leadership
had lost all credibility.
With Gorbachev, the opportunity afforded by the end of
the old leadership gave the new General Secretary the chance
to restaff all branches of the Soviet institutional
structure at a more rapid rate than had existed since World
War II.101

As Gorbachev stated in his analysis of the

problems in 1985:
We first discovered a slowing economic growth.
In
the last fifteen years the national income growth rates
had declined by more than a half and by the beginning
of the 1980s had fallen to a level close to economic
stagnation.
A country [the USSR] that was once quickly
closing on the world's advanced nations began to lose
one position after another. Moreover, the gap in the
efficiency of production, quality of products,
scientific and technological development, the
production of advanced technology, and the use of
advanced techniques began to widen, and not to our
advantage.102
Hough argued that Gorbachev from the beginning enjoyed firm
support in the Central Committee, which permitted him to
consolidate his power at the pinnacle.103

Indeed, it has

been suggested that there may have been an agreement between
Chernenko and Gorbachev on the phasing of the transfer of
power following Andropov's death in 1984 .104

At the

Nineteenth CPSU Conference in 1985, Yegor Ligachev confirmed
101Ibid., p. 100.
102Ness, pp. 2-3.
103Jerry F.
Hough,
Opening U p
The Soviet Economy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), p. 27.
104Ibid. . p. 27.
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that a strong coalition of Viktor Chebrikov (KGB chairman),
Andrei Gromyko (Foreign Minister), Mikhail Solomentsev
(Chairman of the Party Control Commission) and "a large
group of obkom first secretaries" enabled the Central
Committee to take "the only correct decision" in appointing
Gorbachev.105
It should have been recognized that the performance of
the Soviet economy would prove critical to the effectiveness
of the new regime. Gorbachev moved swiftly against some
rivals, yet he maintained a balanced team.106

Although he

displayed goodwill towards such rivals as Yegor Ligachev and
Boris Yeltsin, he succeeded in eliminating most of his clear
opponents.

All of the fourteen republic party secretaries,

for instance, were replaced between 1986 and 1989.

There

was certainly no doubt that Gorbachev formed a leadership
team that reflected his priorities, with Yegor Ligachev, not
yet an opponent, the number two man in the Soviet Union.
But, as became apparent in later years, many of Gorbachev's
political appointees expressed doubts about the scope and
pace of change.
Over the next 6 years, the Soviet reform process
underwent a cycle from moderation to increased
radicalization back to moderation once again.

Subsequently,

105Ronald J. Hill and Jan A. Dellenbrant, Gorbachev and
Perestroika;
Towards a New Socialism?
(England;
Edward
Elgar, 1989), p. 197.
106Ibid. . p. 16.
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the evolution of Gorbachev's reform strategy took the form
of a more or less ad-hoc reaction to events.

Gorbachev

realized that the Soviet Union's economic system was in
trouble, but he had not developed any coherent remedies to
cure its afflictions.

He attempted to minimize adverse

reaction from pressure groups that would mobilize if
perestroika's economic content was made more ambitious.107
This was to prove especially true in regard to the
agricultural sector.
In the spring of 1985, Gorbachev and Ligachev were
political allies.

However, this changed over the next few

years, when Ligachev realized the full potential of
Gorbachev's reform proposals, and in particular, the threat
they posed to the party apparatus and ministers.

As

Ligachev stated in 1987:
Is there any guarantee that the reforms will be
accomplished in full, without deformations and
deviations.
Of course, there are. Above all there is
the leading role of the Communist Party in the process
of perestroika.108
By 1988, Ligachev was in control of Soviet agricultural
policy, as the Secretary of Agriculture.

He and Chebrikov

had become much more conservative in their views of
perestroika, and were opponents of privatization of the

107Desai, p. 104.
108Christopher Donnelly, Gorbachev's Revolution: Economic
Pressures and Defence Realities (England: Jane's Information
Group, 1989), p. 26.

62

economy.

Ligachev had repeatedly spoken on the role of

agriculture, but he continued to say as little as possible
about reform measures.

For instance, he did not even

mention the possibility of family farms or leaseholds.

As

Aslund suggested, Ligachev "appeared to drag his feet
without offering any alternative."109

The strong political

position of conservatives such as Ligachev was a primary
reason that the Soviet Union did not follow the reform
process of Hungary and China, and emphasize reforms in the
agricultural sector.

In addition, Ligachev's political

attacks on the speed of Gorbachev's policies were not
concentrated upon Gorbachev's decision to emphasize economic
reforms in the industrial sector. His conservative approach
did not exclude alterations in the economy, but promoted
changes that would continue to preserve the status-quo.110
In October 1988, Yeltsin launched a bitter
attack upon Ligachev, suggesting that he had impeded reform
measures.111

Yeltsin went so far as to argue that even

Gorbachev's policies were benefitting no one.112

Yeltsin's

behavior in this matter was unusual in that he "went public"
in the dispute with his colleagues.

He was impatient with

109Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle For Economic Reform
(New York:
Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 57.
110Ibid. , p. 55.
m Donnelly, p. 26.
112Donnelly, p. 28.
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what he considered the slow pace of needed reforms.

He was

stripped of his Politburo candidate membership, but was
allowed to retain the rank of minister and his membership in
the Central Committee.
As a result of this debate, Gorbachev began to depict
himself as a man of moderation, caught between the two
camps.

In a meeting with newspaper and journal editors in

1988, he stated that "the danger to his policies lay not
only on the Yeltsinist left but also and especially on the
political right.113

He continued to argue that he

supported the "socialist choice" of step-by-step reforms and
the maintenance of the Soviet Union.114

As Yegor Ligachev

pointed out, the problem is that "blind radicalism,
improvisation, and swerving from side to side have yielded
us little good."115
The economic reform strategy adopted in 1987-88 sought
to move the Soviet Union away from stifling bureaucratic
control through adjustments in the planning system which
would, it was hoped, increase its efficiency without
dismantling it altogether.

In particular, Gorbachev's

reform movement had three goals:
economic growth;

(1) to reinvigorate

(2) to restructure the Soviet economy

113Pravda, 13 January,

1988.

114,1Gorbachev Lashes Democratic Opposition,"
Post. 27 February 1991, Sec. A, p. A 14, col. 1.
115John Kohan,
1990, p. 31.

"It's Lonely Up There,"

Washington

Time. July 16,
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towards consumer goods and social services?

(3) to shift

from extensive to intensive growth based on innovating new
products.
Gorbachev attempted to weaken the vertical links
between ministries and enterprises by removing approximately
one-third of the bureaucracy.

Each reshuffle that Gorbachev

implemented had been hailed as a defeat of the
conservatives.

Although he replaced thousands of personnel

all over the Soviet Union, he did not resort to a massive
retirement plan.

Deng Xiaoping utilized a retirement plan

in China in order to get rid of millions of unproductive
civil servants and military officials.

In many parts of the

Soviet Union, acute labor shortages made such a strategy
impractical.116

By the late 1980s, out of twelve full

Politburo members, Gorbachev could only count on the support
of two, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev.117

While the

conservatives lacked a common alternative policy or the
means to pursue it, what they did have was the ability to
impede the adoption and implementation of radical
policies.118

As the new Russian republic leader Boris

Yeltsin recently suggested:
The objective results of the past six years have
shown that we have been dealing not with perestroika
116Naylor, p. 220.
117Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms:
(New York:
Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 18.
118Ibid. . p. 363.

1985-1990

65

[restructuring] but rather the last phase of
stagnation.119

4.2

The Agricultural Sector

Agriculture remains "the" problem sector, the overall
ineffectiveness of which leads to distortions in the
allocation of resources.

It is an obstacle to the Soviet

Union's attaining the status of a modern society.

Unlike

the situation in Hungary and China, the party has been
significantly entrenched in the Soviet countryside where
conservative opposition to reform has constituted a
bottleneck to rapid and substantial progress.
The Soviet Union has continued to rely on imports of
farm products.

When Gorbachev came to power in 198 5, Soviet

agriculture produced only 80 per cent of the U.S.
agricultural output, but it required eight times the number
of farm workers.120

Despite the fact that Gorbachev worked

in the agricultural sector of the economy for much of his
career, in his first few years in office he introduced no
major reforms in this area.
The Soviet Union needs to become more self-sufficient
in agricultural products and foodstuffs. Although it
ii9»iYeltsin Urges Talks To Overhaul Nation,"
The
Washington Post. 30 March 1991, Sec. A, p. A 14, cols. 4-5.
120Zacek, p. 249.
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allocated 33 per cent of its total investment and 3 0 per
cent of its total labor force to agriculture, by 1985 it had
not attained self-sufficiency in agricultural production.
Part of the problem was that the share of agricultural
employment in Soviet total civilian employment declined from
49 to 18 per cent in the 1940-85 period, but by far the
greater problem is poor productivity and huge spoilage of
products due to inadequate transport and marketing
systems.121

The sector also suffered from the relative

priority given to heavy industry and to an overemphasis on
gross output results in agriculture.122
As the Hungarian and Chinese reforms demonstrated,
reform in this sector in the mid-1980s could have brought
increased productivity almost immediately, and would have
likely solved many of the political problems that Gorbachev
later encountered.

However, top party leaders in the Soviet

Union such as Ligachev and Yeltsin remained divided over the
merits of the family farming programme.

Gorbachev himself

even expressed these concerns at a Party Plenum in March
1989:
Great concern over [food supply has been] raised
at a recent Party report-back and election meetings and
conferences...The real situation is such that we are
experiencing shortages of farm produce.
The state has
to buy large quantities of grain, meat, fruit,

121See,
pp. 390-1.

for instance, Narod Noe Khoziaistvo SSSR,

122Feinberg et al., p. 59.
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vegetables, and some other produce abroad. We are
still behind developed countries, big and small, in
productivity, yield capacity of fields and livestock
productivity and in the diversity and quality of
foodstuffs.
The gap is widening rather than narrowing.
The shortage of food creates social tension and
generates not merely criticism but actual discontent on
the part of the people...So far, we have been unable to
find a cardinal solution to the food problem despite
the fact that this is a country which
possesses such great potential.123
The very limited number of family contract teams (or
groups of families working together) that have come into
existence have achieved a sharp rise in labor productivity
and an increase in food production.

However, at the urging

of more conservative leaders, Gorbachev hesitated in
breaking up state farms and turning them into private farms.
Ligachev and other critics had expressed fears that such
action would cause the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Agricultural producers have been forced to continue the
practice of selling most of their output to the government
at low prices.

Private activity was.only supposed to act

where the socialist sector had failed entirely, that is to
complement and not to compete with the socialist sector,
neither for inputs nor on output markets.124
As a consequence,

food rationing went into effect in

many parts of the Soviet Union in 1988.

Gorbachev actually

strengthened the existing neo-Stalinist system in this

123David Lane, Soviet Society Under Perestroika
Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 46.
124Aslund, p. 160.
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sector by creating a new agricultural super-ministry known
as Gosagroprom.

By 1989, the ministry was "flooding the

collective farms with instructions and regulations," which
amounted to more than 5,000 categories of forms and
bulletins, containing eight million planning indicators.125
In March of 1989, Gorbachev decided to abolish Gosagroprom
but reaffirmed the collective principle and denied that
there was any intention of returning to private landed
property.
Rather than confront the idea of moving to private
farming, Gorbachev tried to give rewards and incentives
within the context of socialist ownership.

For instance,

Gorbachev felt that the ideal model was the kolkhoz, where
work is performed by teams of peasants who have leased land.
Consequently, in 1988-89, farmers were allowed to lease (not
own) land privately.

The problem has been that leaseholders

were totally dependent on the kolkhoz.

They had to grow

what they were instructed to, and had to utilize the
equipment that was provided to them.

Additionally,

industrial enterprises could take away their land when it
was in their interest.126

Thus, there was no attempt to

transform the kolkhozes into cooperatives, which have proven
successful in other countries.

It should be recalled that

125Goldman, p. 165.
126Donald D. Barry et al., Perestroika At The Crossroads
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), p. 190.
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the Hungarian cooperative movement became successful only
after the cooperatives became independent of the state.127
Although work groups within state and collective farms
have been encouraged to lease land and equipment and work on
a contract basis, the element of private ownership on a
larger scale is still absent in the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, even these limited changes were obstructed by
political and ideological reservations.

For instance, the

decision to grant leases was left up to the collective and
state farms, which were hardly likely to exercise it in a
permissive manner.
Although the new Soviet leadership called for radical
changes in the agricultural sector in 1985, there was very
little departure from the neo-Stalinist model.
particular, the appointment of

In

Ligachev as agricultural

secretary certainly did not assist the reform process in
this sector.

The resistance of such conservative reformers

prevented many of the bold approaches that were implemented
in Hungary and China.

Instead, a series of piecemeal

measures were attempted, which failed to produce
improvements.

The failure of agriculturalists to free

themselves from the clutches of the bureaucracy revealed the
gulf between Gorbachev's rhetoric on breaking down the neo-

127Ibid., p. 190.
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Stalinist structures in agriculture and the rather diffident
policies actually proposed.128

4.3

The Industrial Sector

The industrial reform movement since 1985 has proved an
even more difficult undertaking than reform in the
agricultural sector.

The theoretical reform program called

for state planners to stop meddling in enterprises on every
minute detail.

It consisted of four components:

(1) The

state could no longer tell each factory what to produce or
to whom to sell their products

(2) State distribution of

materials was to be phased out.

Enterprises were to buy raw

materials directly from the enterprise that made them

(3)

The annual plan would be eliminated, and replaced with a
Five-year plan with broad targets

(4) Enterprises would

finance their own investment activities.
In practice, however, control over enterprises by the
ministries was not abolished, but there was less political
resistance to reforms in this sector than in the
agricultural sector.

Unlike the situation in agriculture,

reforms in this sector would not necessarily deprive a large
share of the party apparatus of its reason to exist.
analysis below demonstrates, the reform measures by
128Sakwa, pp. 290-1.
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Gorbachev in the industrial sector over the past 6 years
have actually served to make the party apparatus more
entrenched than streamlined.
In order for the goals of this reform program to be
implemented, the Soviet system was supposed to set up a
stock market, whereby citizens could buy shares in
enterprises.

This process would not only make enterprises

self-financing, but would also increase discipline and
profitability.

Even on paper, however, the reforms did not

go far enough to inject market-forces into the economy.

The

role of central planning kept operating in much of the same
way that it did prior to the Gorbachev regime.
As an example, ministries, instead of overseeing the
input and output operations of enterprises, were to concern
themselves with investment and technology policy.

The

problem was that the ministries continued to be held
responsible for final results, rather than the enterprises.
Since the ministries were held responsible, they were not
willing to give up their levers for plan fulfillment.

In

particular, enterprises did not really make their own
decisions, the annual plan was not abolished, and ministries
were still responsible for making firms adhere to planned
targets.
In 1986, a system of "state orders" was introduced and
the overwhelming majority of industrial production is now
produced according to these orders.

State orders, however,
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are the same production plans with a different name.
Similarly, enterprises are supposed to be guided by a fiveyear plan which they compile themselves.

Nevertheless,

their five-year plans must be partly based on "control
figures" received from Gosplan and other ministries.129
The central offices delegated decisions about state purchase
orders to the various ministries, leaving no room for
independent economic activity.
Since they were strictly bound by the central plan,
enterprises did not have the right to change the volume or
the variety of output even if they had the resources to
produce goods in great demand on the most favorable terms.
Thus, the economic environment for enterprises has remained
unstable.

A production plan that more or less balances

available resources can be changed several times in the
course of a year.130
A major aim of the economic reform program in this
sector was to stimulate rapid technological progress.

It

was hoped that enterprises would compete against each other
for orders and would be under pressure to make profits and
eliminate losses.131

Firms that operated under market

129Michael Ellman, The USSR In The 1990s: Struggling Out
Of Stagnation (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1989), p.
39.
130Tatyana Zaslavskaya, The Second Socialist Revolution:
An Alternative Soviet Strategy
(Bloomington:
Indiana
University Press, 1990), p. 72.
131Ellman, p. 38.
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conditions would be responsive to the needs of consumers,
not planners.

The problem was that there has been hardly

any change, except that an enterprise that did realize
profits often had them transferred to the state budget.
In 1987, the Soviet Union passed a new law on the state
enterprise, formulated primarily by Gorbachev and Nikolai
Ryzhkov.

The stress was on the independent industrial firm,

which was to be "loosely" controlled by the central
bureaucracy.132

Worker's self-management was supposed to

shift more decision making from the ministries to the
workers.

By 1988, this model was deemed unworkable by the

leadership.

The Gorbachev regime admitted that they had

failed to shift decision making from the economic
bureaucracy to the enterprises.

However, this was to be

expected, since Article 9 of the Law On State Enterprises
stated the following:
The supervising organ must not intervene in the
enterprise's operation and economic activity, while it
must control the activity of the enterprise.133
The system of state orders and centralized microeconomic planning still conduct business as usual.

Notions

of autonomy in this sector have not only been stalled, they
were effectively blocked by the party apparatus.134

Soviet

132Aslund, p. 180.
133Barry et al., pp. 180-1.
134John E. Tedstrom, ed. , Socialism. Perestroika. and The
Dilemmas Of Soviet Economic Reform (London: Westview Press,
1990), p. 171.

managers today have no idea about how to function in a
market-oriented economy.

They have always been sheltered by

being able to look upwards for guidance.

Furthermore, the

enterprise has become so entangled in a web of directives
that it has lost all sense of initiative, content to take
life as it comes, safe in the knowledge that the state will
pick up the bill and pay the wages of its workers.135

The

rigidities, the overcentralization, the built-in
disincentives for innovation and initiative, the burdensome
bureaucratization

all mean that in the absence of a

radical transformation in the administration of the neoStalinist economy, the USSR's relative position as an
industrial power will continue to decline.136

In fact, the

1.7 per cent rise in industrial output in 1989 was the worst
result in the Soviet Union since 1945.137

4.4

Conclusions

Already in 1982, when Brezhnev died, it was apparent
that the Soviet economy had been allowed to drift by a
complacent if not actually incompetent group of leaders.

135Basile Kerblay,
Gorbachev1s
Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 31.
136Horelick, p. 262.
137S a k w a , p. 281.
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the spring of 1985, there was a feeling that sharp,
immediate remedial action was vital, not only for the Soviet
Union's self-esteem and international prestige, but even for
the system's survival.

As the analysis above reveals, the

problem has been that Gorbachev was too focused on the
notion of economic gradualism in the economic reform
process.

He has had to conduct a balancing act between

conservatives who want to "further perfect" the neoStalinist model and liberals who want to eradicate it.

The

problem is that it is the political and economic structure
of the economy that retards rapid changes and renders the
economy inflexible in the face of a rapidly changing
environment.138
As a result of all of these failures, it is now clear
that Gorbachev has not fulfilled his promises.
Unfortunately, the growth rate is lower than ever before,
the flow of consumer goods has not increased, and the Soviet
economic system has failed to make the change from an
extensive to an intensive growth strategy.

The system of

management that has been in operation is still characterized
by excessive centralization, extreme rigidity, and poor
adaptability to different and changing conditions in place
and time.

As Roy Medvedev pointed out:
Gorbachev is having to face the fact that with the

138John P. Hardt and Sheila N. Heslin, Perestroika: A
Sustainable Process For Change
(New York: Group of Thirty,
1989), p. 46.
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exception of some people in the [privately run]
cooperative sector, perestroika reforms in six years
have improved the material life of absolutely no one in
the country.
In most cases, life is worse.139
This is because Gorbachev has attacked the problems of the
economy by reorganizing bureaucratic structures and
rearranging rights and responsibilities among the various
layers in the administrative hierarchy.1*0

The leadership

did not take charge and solve the problems of the neoStalinist model by moving substantially further towards the
market.
While the transition from the neo-Stalinist model is
complex, problems

can be alleviated if an approach is

adopted that builds upon the Hungarian

and Chinese lessons.

Despite knowledge

of poor agricultural performance in the

Soviet Union, the

leadership responded with limited

administrative changes aimed at improving performance while
keeping the structure centralized.

Consequently, there was

hardly any success resembling the reform programs that have
been achieved in these other countries.
The Soviet leadership believed that the Soviets had to
maintain state targets on "critical goods."

Although the

enterprises were supposed to receive increased autonomy, the
central administration was still supposed to guarantee the
139"Gorbachev Proposes Tough Crisis Measures,"
The
Washington Post. 10 April 1991, Sec. A, p. A 27, col. 4.
U0Susan J. Linz and William Moskoff, Reorganization and
Reform In The Soviet Union
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1988),
p. 19.

77

supply of certain products to the economy.141

The problem

was that this eventually meant that the production of almost
everything one can imagine remained under state control.
That established a contradiction between the new rights of
enterprises and hierarchical relationships which continued
to be dominated from above.

Ministerial operation of

enterprises has continued to undermine all possibilities of
reform.

To the extent that the government keeps its older

goals in mind and goes after maximum capacity at the expense
of efficiency, it sets long-term indicators at different
levels for more and less profitable enterprises.142
All of Gorbachev's proposals thus far have
unrealistically assumed that the Soviet Union can obtain the
growth of a market economy without sacrificing
egalitarianism and state controls, as well as the security
provided by a socialist system.

The new accounting

arrangements, for example, do not create markets or
competition, and profit-based incentives will continue to be
deprived of real economic content because administratively
determined prices are* retained.143
measures are ultimately unworkable.

Compromises and halfAs Iurri Andropov once

pointed out, "It is insufficient just to improve the system
141Ed A. Hewett, Reforming The Soviet Economy: Equality
Versus
Efficiency
(Washington,
D.C.:
The Brookings
Institution, 1988), p. 24.
142Juviler and Kimura, p. 92.
143Linz and Moskoff, p. 20.
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of rewards;

one must also produce the necessary quantity of

commodities which are in demand."144
Gorbachev's response to this problem has been that "We
write the rules here, and we will not accept anyone
dictating to us.
from anyone."145

We do not need any teachers or lessons
This is precisely the reason why the

Soviet economy today is in worse shape than at any time
since the Soviets took over in 192 5.

Gorbachev has taken a

path that mixes political caution with bold, but certainly
not overly risky, reforms.

Can he learn anything from the

reform programs in Hungary and China?

This is the question

that will be addressed in the final chapter.

144"Rech General1 Nogosekretaria Tsk KPSS Tovarisctcha Iu.
V. Andropova," Kommunist. no. 9, June 1983, p. 9.
145|lGorbachev Lashes Democratic Opposition," p. A 17.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a great deal of uncertainty and debate about
the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union, but about
one thing there does seem to be strong consensus:

The

Soviet Union today stands at a crossroads, with a future
more open to a range of diverse possibilities
revolutionary kind

some of a

than anyone could have imagined less

than six years ago.146

If Gorbachev remains on his present

course of "reform,” the large-scale state sector will remain
predominant and will probably remain subject to mainly
bureaucratic, rather than market, forces.
The examples of economic reform offered by Hungary and
China demonstrate that the neo-Stalinist economic model is
capable of reform, even if it cannot be immediately
eliminated.

The purpose of employing the market as an

instrument of reform in a command economy is to force
competition and thereby enhance efficiency.147

Rather than

relying upon central planning, there must be markets that
are made competitive to ensure enterprise profits, and means
must be found so that profits do not simply accrue to
146Horelick, p. 1.
147Ness, p. 3.
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monopolistic state-owned enterprises, or pass on the state.
Profits must arise from the competitive use of
resources and the quality of production.

Private economic

activity has strong advantages in stimulating performance
and it infringes on socialist values only slightly whenever
three conditions exist:

(1) The activity must be labor

intensive, so that it will not need to draw much on the
central system for material inputs

(2) It must involve

great adaptability to satisfying the heterogenous tastes of
purchasers

(3) It must produce consumer goods for

households rather than producer goods for the central
system.148

The results that have been achieved in Hungary

and China attest to the need for the Soviet Union to shift
from state to more private ownership using these guidelines.
In the Soviet Union, a steady flow of inconsistent
measures has resulted in little or no coherent coordination.
The concentration of economic power in the upper echelons of
an organizational-management pyramid automatically nullifies
free management and leads to the suppression of individual
initiative.149

Hungary and China demonstrated that only

when the central ministries are eliminated, in any sector of
the economy is it possible to expand enterprise autonomy and

148Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 89.
149A.
Ageev
and
D.
Kuzin,
"Socialism
and
Entrepreneurship," Soviet Review, vol. 32, no. 1, JanuaryFebruary 1991, p. 10.
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avoid recentralization.150
In China, the economy was made more market-oriented,
especially with the dismantling of the communes.

If Soviet

land is eventually returned to the peasant as in the Chinese
case, it is likely that eventually the state ownership of
other means of production will be eliminated.

As in

Hungary, the reforms in China have now been expanded more
successfully into the industrial sector of the economy, as
these two countries attempt at different levels to move
further away from the neo-Stalinist model.

Measures in

Hungary and China were approved to reduce the extent of
central planning and the role of government and party in
day-to-day business operations in this sector as well.151
An important difference, however, between Soviet and
Chinese decollectivization is the apparent Soviet intention
to concentrate any marketing activities in official
organizations.152

This neglects a very important lesson

that may be drawn from the Chinese economic reforms.

A

major reason for the improved availability of food in
Chinese cities in the 1980s was the legalization of private
retail trade, which currently accounts for approximately 17
per cent of all retail trade.153
150Nee and Stark, p. 343.
151Linz and Moskoff, p. 41.
152Ellman, p. 27.
153Ellman, p. 27.
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In addition, the Soviets might be successful were they
to set up Special Economic Zones (SEZs) analogous to those
in China.

These could serve to attract foreign firms and

provide increased connections to the world market.

Western

firms are interested in obtaining Soviet raw materials,
access to hard currency markets in the Soviet Union, and
markets for their own products and technical knowledge.15'1
SEZs might offer foreign firms much greater freedom from
bureaucratic restrictions than exists in the rest of the
Soviet Union, and this may serve to pave the way for
increased joint-ventures.
At the present time, the Soviet economy is in many ways
a closed economy, in that external economic ties play a
lesser role here than in many other countries.

Increased

contacts through the SEZ mechanism could speed initial
reforms in the sector where they should have begun, namely
agriculture.

Many Soviet officials and senior economists

have visited the Chinese Special Economic Zones and observed
the household responsibility system at work.

However, even

reformists to date have written little and ambiguously about
their operation.155
The Hungarian economic reforms in particular provide an
example whereby agricultural cooperatives can sell to the

154Ellman, p. 97.
155See, for instance, Fedor Burlatski in Literaturnaya
Gazeta, 11 June 1986 and Izvestiya, 19 January 1987.
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state or do their own marketing, and there is substantial
autonomy in deciding on the use of profits.

Likewise, even

the state farms here have been able to do their own
marketing, since the abolition of the central planning of
farm production in 1968.

Furthermore, people were

compensated for land seized under communist rule.

This was

positive news for Hungarian farmers, who have been able to
reclaim land taken from them before nationalization.156
Nearly 50 per cent of Hungary's arable land could be claimed
as a result of this bill passed by Parliament in April,
1991.
In the Soviet case, cooperatives and state farms are
still centrally controlled through production and output
quotas.

Although a limited number of private plots operate

on a market basis, the role of private farming has declined
since Gorbachev came to power.

In addition to the

conservative bias that Gorbachev confronted, this is partly
because of the fact that although restrictions on private
agricultural production are now more relaxed, private
producers still have'the lowest claim on state resources.
Reforms must consist primarily of creating private plots or
independent cooperatives with incentives to grow and sell
o n e 1s own output.
Competitive cooperatives in the agricultural sector may

156"Hungary To Give Land, Credit To Dispossessed,"
The
Washington Post. 25 April 1991, Sec. A, p. A 22, col. 5.
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provide a measurement device for possibilities in the state
enterprises.

The present vertical hierarchy needs to be

replaced by more horizontal integration.

Hungary and China

demonstrated that it is impossible to realize a new
"intensive" growth strategy without changing the central
institution of the neo-Stalinist legacy, i. e., the
hierarchical administrative machinery that makes individuals
responsive to higher level officials.157

At some point the

large collective and state farms must necessarily be
dismantled, and individuals must become responsive to
markets, perhaps by farming cooperatives.
As I have pointed out previously, Gorbachev hesitated
to implement reforms in the agricultural sector.

Breaking

from the pattern of "agriculture-first" established in
Hungary and China was a crucial flaw that must be reversed.
What made the regime's reluctance to take decisive action so
puzzling was that this was an area in which radical
institutional change could have been introduced on a broad
scale in an isolatable context without dramatically changing
the traditional central planning elsewhere.158

The fact

that China successfully replicated the Hungarian experiment
with a population 100 times the size of Hungary should
further demonstrate the credibility of this experience in

157Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 89.
158Bialer and Mandelbaum, p. 87.
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the eyes of Soviet leaders.159

Just as important is the

fact that both countries demonstrated that in order for this
process to be successful, it is necessary to have political
leadership that can maneuver around the demands of liberal
and conservative political forces.
There needs to be more support in the Soviet Union for
a system of contracting agricultural production work to
"teams, groups, and families," and a more flexible approach
to the marketing of surplus agricultural produce.160

If

they must remain, cooperatives would be given an opportunity
to use or sell, as they see fit, all of the produce
harvested over and above the production targets.

In any

event, cooperatives do work more efficiently than state
enterprises and stimulate the development of new economic
relations in the state economy.161

As the Hungarian

reforms demonstrated, cooperatives in the Soviet Union must
take on increased importance even if the country is
reluctant to move further towards private ownership at the
present moment.
Likewise, the reforms that have now resulted in the
Hungarian and Chinese industrial sectors demonstrate that
there is hope for the Soviet Union.

The determinants of

159Naylor, p. ix.
160Naylor, p. 27.
161T. Kuznetsova, "Cooperatives:
The Tactic Determining
The Practice," The Soviet Review, vol. 31, no. 2, March-April
1990, p. 41.
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output are now controlled in Hungary and China by short-term
plans made by firms, with the state making "informal
requests."

Again, output in the Soviet Union is still

determined by state planners, despite the fact that economic
reforms originated in this sector.

More work obviously must

be accomplished in this sector of economic reforms, but
progress in Hungary and China is undeniable.
It is now certain that there is a need to promote
efficiency by permitting economic competition.

Competition

comes from abroad as well as from competing firms at home.
Hungary and China are already more extensively connected to
the world economy than is the Soviet Union.

In the

Hungarian case in particular, competition was enhanced on a
grand scale by participation in the world market economy.
However, in order for this process to become effective,
there is a need to encourage individual initiative and
entrepreneurship, for which there is little room in a neoStalinist economic model.
As Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyan noted, "Industrial reform
is a more complex matter than agricultural reform."162
Although there are no ideal types, Gorbachev should move
closer to the Hungarian and Chinese solutions, now that it
has been demonstrated that limited changes in the industrial
sector of the economy have failed to produce any dramatic
achievements in the Soviet Union.
162Nee and Stark, p. 331.

In both Hungary and
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China, initial success in the agricultural sector led to
increased demands by party and non-party personnel for a
reduction in central planning in the industrial sector.
Gorbachev and leaders of nine of the fifteen Soviet
republics recently published a joint statement in the
Communist Party newspaper Pravda. declaring their intention
to work together to overcome the country's pending economic
collapse.183

As Samuel Huntington suggested, "it seems

that reforms are even more difficult than revolutions."164

163,iGorbachev, Yeltsin Sign Crisis Pact:
Hard-Line Foes
Lose Leadership Challenge In Central Committee,"
The
Washington Post. 25 April 1991, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1.

184Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise
of Disharmony
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981),
p. 120.
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